Most OT systems can't be patched — they're too old, too critical, or the patch simply doesn't exist. The answer is network-layer protection that shields every legacy device without touching it, updating it, or taking it offline.
BlastShield is a zero-trust network access solution that helps organizations implement a zero-trust architecture.
Instead of relying on enhanced identity governance (EIG), complex layers of micro-segmentation, or cloud-based gateways, BlastShield utilizes a software-defined perimeter (SDP) approach for more granular access controls and reduced risk from stolen credentials and complex management.
Start a free trialIn OT environments, the question "when will this vulnerability be patched?" often has an honest answer: never. A PLC running a critical production line cannot be rebooted for a firmware update during active production. An HMI managing a chemical process cannot risk a failed patch destabilizing a safety-critical controller. And for devices running end-of-life operating systems — Windows XP on an HMI from 2008, for instance — no patch exists to apply.
This creates a structural security gap: critical vulnerabilities in OT devices are published, exploited in the wild, and listed on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog — but the organization operating them cannot remediate through the standard patching process.
Capability
Traditional Patching
Traditional Patching
Protects end-of-life devices
Per-session authentication and authorization, least-privilege access, and an assume-breach posture enforced by the Orchestrator (policy) and Gateway/Client/Agent.
IEC 62443 (zones & conduits)
Software-defined micro-perimeters and egress policies implement zoning and controlled conduits without physical re-architecture.
NERC CIP (ESP & remote access)
Cloaking, passwordless MFA, least-privilege access, and session recording support electronic access controls and auditable remote access.
TSA Security Directives
Segmentation, access control, and IT/OT separation support the directives, with rapid deployment to meet timelines without downtime.
DarkSide ransomware entered via a compromised VPN account, moved laterally through IT systems, and forced Colonial to proactively shut down OT pipeline operations to prevent spread. 45% of East Coast fuel supply disrupted for 6 days.
REvil ransomware moved from IT into OT environments at the world's largest meat producer, forcing shutdowns of US, Australian, and Canadian processing plants. $11M ransom paid.
LockerGoga ransomware spread laterally through Hydro's global network into OT environments at aluminum smelting operations, forcing a switch to manual processes. $71M in damages.
Attacker accessed a water treatment plant's HMI via remote access software and attempted to increase sodium hydroxide to dangerous levels. The HMI had unrestricted network access to SCADA controls.
No IT endpoint should have network-layer access to OT devices by default. This includes engineering workstations, remote access solutions, historian servers, and any shared services. The IT/OT boundary should enforce a default-deny policy: no communication is permitted unless it is explicitly defined, authorized, and necessary. BlastShield enforces this without requiring VLANs or complex firewall rules.
Preventing IT-to-OT lateral movement is only half the solution. Once an attacker reaches any OT system — through a vendor laptop, a compromised remote access tool, or a breached historian — they must be prevented from moving between OT devices. Each OT zone (production line, utility systems, safety systems) should be isolated with explicit allow-rules for the communication it actually requires.
Historian servers, engineering workstations, and jump servers are the natural crossing points between IT and OT. They must be treated as high-risk assets requiring the strictest access controls. No engineer's laptop should have direct RDP access to an engineering workstation with OT adjacency without going through explicit, logged, authenticated session controls.
Remote access — from engineers, vendors, and contractors — is one of the primary paths ransomware uses to enter OT environments. Replace VPN-based remote access (which grants broad network access upon connection) with zero-trust remote access that enforces least-privilege: each session grants access only to the specific OT device the user is authorized to reach, with no broader network visibility.
Lateral movement traffic looks like normal IT activity — it uses legitimate protocols (SMB, RDP, WMI) and valid credentials. Detecting it requires understanding what "normal" east-west communication looks like in your OT environment and alerting on deviations. A PLC that suddenly initiates connections to other PLCs or to historian servers is exhibiting anomalous behavior that warrants immediate investigation.
Deploy zero-trust microsegmentation that enforces identity-based access controls at every network boundary. Default-deny policies mean no IT endpoint has OT access unless explicitly authorized. Within the OT network, each zone is isolated so that a compromise in one area cannot automatically spread to adjacent systems. BlastShield implements this without requiring network reconfiguration or device agents.
IT-to-OT segmentation blocks traffic crossing the IT/OT boundary (typically enforced by DMZ, firewall, or jump server). OT microsegmentation goes further — it isolates individual devices and zones within the OT network itself. Even if an attacker bypasses the IT/OT boundary (via a compromised jump server, for example), microsegmentation prevents them from reaching adjacent OT devices. Both layers are necessary for comprehensive lateral movement prevention.
Yes. BlastShield's software-defined approach deploys as an overlay on your existing network — it does not require replacing switches, routers, or firewalls. Microsegmentation policy is enforced at the software layer, making it possible to deploy in days rather than the months or years a network hardware replacement would take.
Ransomware spreads between OT systems using the same techniques as human attackers: credential reuse, SMB file shares, remote management protocols, and any other communication path available on the flat OT network. Stopping it requires removing those paths through microsegmentation — so that ransomware on one HMI cannot reach adjacent PLCs, historian servers, or other OT assets.
NERC CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) and IEC 62443 both require network segmentation and access control for OT environments. Specifically, NERC CIP-005 requires Electronic Security Perimeters for Cyber Assets, and IEC 62443 requires zone-and-conduit models with defined communication policies between zones. BlastShield's microsegmentation architecture aligns with and supports compliance with both frameworks.
No. BlastShield's Network Cloaking maintains full connectivity for authorized users while being invisible to unauthorized parties. Engineers, operators, and vendors retain the same remote access they depend on — the difference is that only authenticated users can see or reach the OT asset. Operational continuity is preserved; the attack surface is eliminated.
Make your ICS and SCADA systems invisible to internet scanners and attackers.
Shield vulnerable systems without requiring patches, firmware updates, or downtime.
Eliminate default credentials that enable initial access and lateral movement.
Extend protection to every device on your network, including shadow OT.
See how BlastShield's zero-trust microsegmentation closes every lateral movement path between your IT and OT environments — with no network reconfiguration and no downtime.
Getting started with BlastShield is easy and free. Follow the three steps below and get up and running fast.
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